Empirical investigation of female labor force participation, wages, fertility, and age at marriage in Korea by McElwain, Adrienne & Lee, Bun Song
An Empirical Investigation of Female Labor Force Participation,
 
Wages, artility, and Age at Marriage in Kore,
 
Adrienne McElwain
 
and, .
 
Bun Song Lee
 
Louisiana State University
 
Baton Rouge, LA 70803
 
.March1982
 
ABSTRACT
 
An 1hpirical Investigation of Female Labor Force Participation,
 
Wages,'Fertility, and Age at Marriage in Korea
 
This paper develops a simultaneous equation model of female labor
 
force participation, wages, age at marriage and quality and quantity of
 
children. The model is estimated with individual household data from the
 
1974 Korean World Fertility Survey. The basic theoretical framework of
 
our model is similar to a simultaneous equation model developed by Fleisher
 
and Rhoades (1979). We extend their model by adapting it to the analysis
 
of less-developed countries and adding an age at marriage equation. In
 
addition, the problem of sample selectivity bias in the estimation of the
 
wage equation is investigated.
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1. 	Introduction
 
Recent contributions to the theory of household production and the
 
allocation of time have greatly facilitated the'analysis of the:behavior of
 
households with respect to decisions concerning labor force participation,
 
age at 	marriage, and fertility. Early studies of these decisions generally
 
focused 	on one individual aspect of a household's decision making process
 
and ignored the mutual interdependence among these decisions. Researchers
 
are increasingly recognizing the endogenous nature of a number of variables
 
such as age at marriage, quality and quantityof children, andlabor force
 
participation status. A number of studies [Nerlove and Schultz (1970),
 
Harman (1970), DeVanzo (1972), Maurer, Ratajczak and Schultz (1973), Cain
 
and Dooley (1976), Fleisher and Rhodes (1979), and Link and Settle (1981)]
 
estimate simultaneous equation models of variables such as fertility, labor
 
force participation, and wages. However, the majority of these studies suffer
 
from the shortcomings of using aggregate geographic data rather than the more
 
desirable data on individual households.
 
This paper presents a simultaneous equation rmodelof fertility, age
 
at marriage, intensity of labor force participation during marriage, quality
 
of children, and wages. The model is estimated using individual household
 
data from the 1974 Korean World Fertility Survey and therefore incorporates
 
a number of variables which are of particular importance in less-developed
 
countries. Korea is a particularly interesting country to study because
 
the dramatic declines in the birth rate and the infant mortality rate during
 
the 1960's represent one of the most rapid population changes observed in the
 
history of mankind [Cho (1973)]. These rapid declines in fertility and.
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mortality rates started prior to the period of rapid economic development
 
which began in the late 1960's in Korea. In addition,.women's age at marriage
 
has substantially increased since the 1950's, and female labor force partici-.
 
pation rates increased dramatically in the 1960's and 1970's.
 
Our simultaneous equation model is a variation and extension of one
 
employed by Fleisher and Rhodes (1979) in their investigation of women's-labor
 
market experience, wages, and number and quality of children in the United
 
States. The model presented in this paper is similar to the Fleisher-Rhodes'
 
model in that it assumes the same theoretical framework - the economic fertility 
model of number of children and child quality which was explored by Willis
 
(1973), DeTray (1973), and Becker and Lewis (1973). As a result, our model
 
focuses on a number of the same structural relationships examined by Fleisher
 
and Rhodes. For example, both models regard the relevant female labor supply
 
variable to be the extent to which a woman has participated in the labor force
 
over a period of years rather than as the current labor force participation
 
status. However, there are a number of important differences between our
 
model and the Fleisher-Rhodes' model. First, this paper concentrates on
 
modeling a woman's decisions with respect to labor supply and fertility within
 
the framework of her marriage. While Fleisher and Rhodes focus on a woman's
 
lifetime labor supply (proportion of years worked since leaving school), this
 
paper focuses on a woman's labor supply during the period of her marriage.
 
The maintained hypothesis is that the structural relationship between labor
 
supply and fertility, price and income variables in the years prior to mar­
riage is sufficiently different from the relationship in the years during
 
marriage that concentrating on a woman's lifetime labor supply may introduce
 
biases. -This emphasis on a woman's decisions within the framework of marriage
 
also results, in the addition of one more endogenous variable - woman's age at
 
marriage- to the four variables investigated by Fleisher and Rhodes.
 
A second extension of the Fleisher-Rhodes model involves the estimation
 
of the wage equation. Estimation of a reduced form wage function generates
 
instrumental variable predictions for women's wages which are used in the esti­
mation of the labor force participation equation. However, only a relatively
 
small proportion of women in the Korean sample report wages and it is reasonable
 
to assume that this group of women does not represent a random sampling of all
 
women. The instrumental variable predictions of wages for all women which are
 
generated from a wage equation estimated with data on a nonrandom sample of
 
women will be biased. This paper employs a method of correcting for this
 
sample selectivity bias which was developed by Heckman (1979, 1980), Hay (1980),
 
and Hill (1981).
 
A final major distinction between our model and the Fleisher-Rhodes
 
model stems from our use of data from a less-developed country. In the United
 
States, a woman's labor force participation decision is viewed as a decision
 
"to work or not to work."1 In many lesc-developed countries there exist sub­
stantial opportunities for employment outside the modern labor market. A
 
Korean woman may choose to work in the modern labor market (e.g. as.a paid
 
employee in professional, sales, clerical, service or production work), to be
 
self-employed or an unpaid family worker in the informal or traditional labor
 
market (e.g. working on a family farm), or to not work. This distinction
 
between types of employment is important because the structural relationship
 
1Hill (1981).
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between labor force participation and variables such as fertility may be dif­
ferent for different types of employment. The generally accepted doctrine is
 
that female employment and child rearing activities are not compatible roles
 
and should be negatively related. While employment in the modern work force
 
is no doubt somewhat incompatible with raising children, employment on the
 
family farm may be nearly as compatible with raising children as not working
 
is. This paper attempts to gain insights into this matter by estimating the
 
model with two alternative definitions of labor force participation.
 
Given the above considerations and the basic framework of the Fleisher-

Rhodes' model, the empirical specification of our simultaneous equation model
 
of female labor force participation, number and quality of children, age at
 
marriage, and wages is advanced in Section II. Section III presents the esti­
mated parameters and discusses the more important and interesting results.
 
Conclusions and suggestions for future work are contained in Section IV.
 
II. The Model
 
The economic fertility model assumes that the household's~utility
 
function has child services (number of children and child quality) and market
 
goods as arguments. A mother's and father's time are inputs into the produc­
tion of child services. Maximization of the family utility function subject
 
to a time and budget constraint yields demand equations for numbers of chil­
dren, child quality, and market goods as a function of their prices and full
 
income. Our model expands this basic economic fertility model by incorporating
 
additional endogenous variables - labor force participation, wages, and age
 
at marriage. In addition, the basic economic fertility model is expanded to
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incorporatevariables which reflect certain cultural and demographic factors
 
which affect preferences and production activities.
 
The empirical specification of the relationships implied by theoretical
 
considerations is given in equations (1)through (5). These relationships
 
are assumed to be linear in the variables for observations on women in ag.e
 
groups: 25-29, 30-34, and 35-39.2 All variables are defined in Table 1.
 
(1)The work intensity during marriage equation
 
WKINTAM - f(CEB, LWAGE, EDASPIR, DNNFAM, OWNLAND, URBANl, URBAN2, 
URBAN3, LPOINC). 
(2)The marital fertility rate equation
 
ANLBR - f(DURMR, WKINTAM, EDASPIR, MODCONTR, ED, EDSQ,EDH,EDHSQO
 
MORTR, SHSN, URBAN1, URBAN2, URBAN3, LPOINC, LWAGE)."
 
(3)The duration of marriage equation
 
DURMR - f(DAI, DA2, DA3, DA4, CEB, ED, EDSQ, EDH, EDHSQ, MICR,
 
URBAN1, URBAN2, URBAN3, WKINTBM).
 
(4)The child quality (aspirations for children's education) equation
 
EDASPIR - f(CEB, WKINTAM, LWAGE, ED, EDSQ, EDH, EDHSQ, LPOINC, 
URBAN1, URBAN2, URBAN3, SHSN). 
(5)The wage equation
 
LWAGE - f(ED, EDSQ, URBAN1, URBAN2, URBAN3, WKINTBM, X).
 
The remainder of this section discusses the rationale behind this specification.
 
The work intensity during marriage equation
 
In order to capture the strategy of a woman who is jointly determining
 
the number and quality of her children, her age at marriage, and her labor
 
2Data on six age groups (20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44 and 45-49)
 
were originally analyzed. The results for the youngest group of women are not
 
included here because of sample selectivity bias; i.e. nearly 100% of the women
 
in the othec age Froups are married whereas this is not true for the youngest
 
age group. The sample of women who are age 20-24 and married is not a random
 
sample of all women in this age category and thus the estimated parameters for
 
this group would be biased. The results for the older age groups are not pre­
sented because of space limitations and because they did not provide any addi­
tional evidence or insights of interest. It can also be argued that the quality
of responses of older women to the questionnaire may be poorer than for younger 
age groups because more time has passed since the child-bearing period in their 
life. 
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supply, the labor force participation variable is defined as the proportion of
 
years worked since marriage rather than as current labor force participation
 
status. In order to investigate the possibility that the relationship between
 
labor force participation and variables such as fertility may be different
 
for different types of employment, the system is estimated using two alter­
native definitions of labor force participation:
 
WKINTAH Work intensity after marriage. Labor force participation 
is defined to include participation in either the modern 
or traditional sectors of the labor market. 
WKINTAH2 Work intensity after marriage. Labor force participation 
is defined to include participation in the modern sector 
only. 
All of the structural equations will be estimated separately for both measures
 
of labor force participation.
 
As the roles of mother and labor force participant are generally 'incom­
patible, the coefficient on children ever born (CEB) in the labor force
 
participation equation is expected to be negative. If work in the modern
 
sector is in fact less compatible with child care than work in the informal,
 
agricultural sectors then the coefficient on CEB in the WKINTAM2 equation
 
should be smaller than the corresponding coefficient in the WKINTAM equation.
 
A woman's decision to participate in the labor force is influenced by
 
the wage offered in the market. The natural logarithm of the market wage rate
 
is predicted for all women on the basis of equation (5)and is incorporated
 
in the work intensity equation. It is expected to have a positive influence
 
on the intensity of labor force participation during marriage.
 
The input of parent's time may be crucial in producing child quality
 
and a woman who has aspirations for high quality children may substitute time
 
in the home for time spent working in the market. To the extent that
 
aspirations for children's education is a good proxy for child quality, the
 
coefficient on EDASPIR should be negative if this trade-off between market
 
work and work in producing child quality exists.
 
The coefficient on the dummy variable reflecting the presence of non­
nuclear family members (DNNFAMM) is expected to be positive as these additional
 
family members (often parents or in-laws) may reduce the incompatibility of
 
the roles of mother and workers. In addition, a woman may need to work in
 
order to help support the extended family.
 
If a woman's family owns land she is more likely to work in the informal 
sector as an unpaid family worker and less likely to participate in the modern 
labor market than a woman whose family does not own land. Thus the coefficient 
on OWNILAND is hypothesized to be positive in the WKINTAM equation and negative
 
in the WKINTAM2 equation.
 
The urbanization background variables (URBANl, URBAN2, and URBAN3) are
 
included to capture the influence of a womants attitudes about work insofar
 
as these attitudes are the result of experiences in her "formative years."
 
To the extent that these variables reflect current region of residence they
 
also account for differences in employment opportunities. The coefficients
 
on these variables represent contrasts with ultra-rural women who have lived
 
their entire life in rural areas. In Model 2 the coefficients are expected
 
to be positive as more urban women are more likely to participate in the modern
 
labor market than are more rural women.
 
A woman's labor force participation will be influenced by her husband's
 
wage rate and by the non-wage income of the family. It is assumed that:the
 
husband's labor supply is exogenous so that there is no substitution in house­
hold production between the husband's and the wife's time. The husband's
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income plus asset income are assumed to affect a woman's work intensity throu,
 
an income effect only. This income variable (LPOINC) is incorporated in the
 
work intensity equation in logarithmic form. It is expected to be negatively
 
related to the labor force participation variable.
 
The marital fertility rate equation
 
Traditional economic models of fertility express children ever born
 
to a woman as a function of income and other socioeconomic variables which
 
attempt to proxy the price of and preference for children. The fertility
 
variable in this equation is the marital fertility rate, ANLBR, which is
 
computed by dividing children ever born by the duration of marriage. Use of
 
ANLBR with age stratified data controls for the biological constraints on
 
fertility which are imposed by such factors as exposure to intercourse (and
 
hence duration of marriage) and age-patterns of fertility. That is, "since
 
fecundity varies by age, two women who have the same duration of marriage
 
but were married at different ages will have different numbers of births if
 
neither is controlling fertility or if they are both controlling at the same
 
'3
level." In addition, two women who were married at the same age but who have
 
been married for different lengths of time will have different numbers of
 
children because their exposure to the risk of conception is different, ceteris
 
paribus. The need to hold constant the influence of duration of marriage and
 
age-patterns of fertility resulted in the use of ANLBR in conjunction with
 
age-stratified data.
4
 
3Boulier and Rosenzweig (1978a), p. 5.
 
4The reader is referred to Lee and McElwain (1981a) for a more detailed
 
discussion of ANLBR and a comparison of ANLBR withseveral alternative measures
 
of fertility.
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There is somewhat of an inconsistency in using ANLBR as a left-hand
 
side variable and CEB as a right-hand side variable in a system of equations.
 
However, it is felt that the number of children rather than ANLBR exerts an
 
influence on variables such as labor force participatIon. The formulation of
 
the fertility equation in terms of ANLBR is in order to adjust for the-,influ­
ence of duration of marriage on children ever born, not because it is felt
 
that ANLBR is the important decision variable. The use of two different mea­
oures of fertility should provide more insiphts than iflthe model was restricted
 
to the use of only one measure of fertility.
5
 
The duration of marriage variable is included to capture a non-linear
 
relationship: increasing the duration of marriage increases fertility at a
 
decreasing rate. As discussed previously, it is expected that the coefficient
 
on the labor force participation variable will be negative due to the.fact
 
that raising children is a time intensive activity andmay inhibit market work.
 
A woman's aspirations for her children's education is included in the
 
ANLBR equation as a proxy for child quality. The idea of a trade-off between
 
quality and quantity of children, which has been dealt' with extensively in the
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literature, suggests a negative coefficient on EDASPIR..
 
5See Fleisher and Rhodes (1979) for a similar "inconsistency" in model
 
specification. Their inconsistency involves defining two variables for labor
 
force participation. The first, R, is the proportion of years worked since
 
leaving school and is used on the left-hand side of one equation in their system.
 
The second, R', is years worked and is incorporated in their model as a right
 
hand side variable in a wage equation.
 
6Child quality is obviously multifaceted and includes elements of heredity,
 
luck, investments in formal schooling and investments in less formal means of
 
education. However, the only aspect of child quality which is directly mea­
surable is the amount of formal schooling. To avoid the selectivity bias which
 
would result if only women whose children had completed schooling were included
 
in the analysis we use educational aspirations.
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The variable MODCONTR is incorporated in the marital fertility equation
 
in order to capture the efficiency with which a woman attempts to control fer­
tility.7 The relationship between MODCONTR and the marital fertility rate is
 
expected to be negative.
 
There is considerable'evidence of a negative correlation between fer­
tility and parent's education attainment [T. W. Schultz (1973), DeTray:(1973)].
 
If this is due to a positive correlation between age at marriage and parent's
 
educational attainment then the coefficients on the parent's education var­
iables may be small and insignificant in the marital fertility rate equation
 
(which controls for age at marriage by the adjustment for marriage duration
 
and the use of age stratified data). The education variables are included to
 
account for any negative correlation between parent's education and fertility
 
which is due to the influence of "tastes, efficacy of birth control, or effi­
ciency in household production"8 rather than due to the relationship between
 
age at marriage and parent's educational attainment.
 
The personal child mortality rate, MORTR, is expected to have a posi­
tive impact on fertility in that a family is generally expected to at least
 
partially replace any of their children who die.9 Consideration of a strong
 
preference for sons in Korea and the fact that Korean women often desire some
 
target number of sons led to incorporation of the share of sons variable, SHSN.
1 0
 
7See Lee and McElwain (1981b) for a specification which treats the use
 
of modern methods of birth control as endogenous. Those result do not vary
 
much from the results reported here.
 
8Willis (1973), p. 551.
 
9See Schultz (1976), Ben-Porath (1976), and Lee and Schultz,(1981).
 
1OThe mortality variable and the son preference variable are incorporated
 
as the mortality rate and the share of sons rather than as the number of.child
 
deaths and the number of sons to reduce the obvious spurious correlation between
 
these latter measures and fertility. See Lee and Schultz (1981).,,
 
The coefficient of this variable should be negative. The coefficient on the
 
income variable in the fertility rate equation is expected to be positive.
 
Finally, the urbanization background variables are incorporated to capture a
 
woman's attitudes and preferences with respect to children. It is hypothesized
 
that more urbanized women will have fewer children, ceteris paribus, so that
 
the coefficients on these variables should be negative.
 
The duration of marriage equation
 
Work by Becker (1973, 1974) Keeley (1977, 1979), and Anderson and Hill
 
(1980) demonstrates that the decision to marry can be viewed as a rational
 
choice influenced by economic considerations. In Korea, where nearly all
 
women marry, the decision variable of interest is age at marriage rather than
 
whether or not to marry. When age-stratified data is used and age dummy var­
iables (DAl-DA4) are included as independent variables, a duration of marriage
 
equation is essentially the mirror image of an age at marriage equation. For
 
consistency with the use of duration of marriage in the ANLBR equation, this
 
model specifies a duration of marriage equation.
 
A woman's decision about when to marry depends upon the costs and
 
benefits of marriage. These are influenced by her desire for children, her
 
education level, her experiences as a single woman (labor force status prior
 
to marriage), urbanization background, and characteristics of her husband such
 
as his level of education. All of these variables except a woman's desire
 
for children are hypothesized to have a positive impact on age at marriage and
 
I1A husband's education level affects the gains from marriage. It will
 
also affect the husband's age at marriage. Since a majority of Korean men
 
marry women about five years younger than they are, the husband's education
 
level will also influence the woman's age at marriage.
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heuc, a negative impact on duration of marriage. Children ever born is incor­
porated as a proxy for the desire for children and its coefficient is expected
 
to be positive.
 
A final factor which influences age at marriage in less-developed
 
countries is the perceived rate of infant mortality. Many marriages are
 
arranged by parents and if 
a woman or her parents expect that a high proportion
 
of her children may die, an early marriage may be arranged so that she is more,
 
likely to have some desired number of children. The regional child moftality,
 
rate, MICR, is incorporated to capture this influence. The coefficient on. .,i'
 
MICR in the duration of marriage equation is expected to be positive.
 
The child quality equation
 
As mentioned earlier, child quality is multi-faceted and a parent's
 
aspirations for children's education is only a proxy for child quality.
 
The children ever born variable is expected to have a negative impact
 
on aspirations for children's education because of the trade-off between child
 
quality and quantity. The education levels of the parents are hypothesized
 
to be important determinants of child quality in that more educated parents
 
are likely to have preferences for high quality children. The income variable
 
is expected to have a positive coefficient in this equation as child quality
 
is considered a normal good.
 
The urbanization variables are included because a woman's'urbanization
 
background is likely tc influence her preferences between quantity and quality
 
of children. These variables also reflect currentregion of residence,-and
 
are incorporated to reflect the idea that schooling in urban areas may be a
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better investment than it is in rural areas., The coefficients on the urbani­
zation variables are expected to be positive as they reflect a contrast with
 
ultra-rural women.
 
The woman's wage rate is a determinant of the price of quality since
 
the mother's time is an input into the production of child quality. The coeffi­
cient is expected to be negative. The woman's labor force participation status
 
is also assumed to affect her aspirations for child quality although it is
 
theoretically unclear what the sign of the labor force participation variable
 
will be. A mother may participate less in the labor force so that her time
 
might be spent in producing child quality. On the other hand, a woman who
 
works may be better able to recognize the returns which her children might
 
realize from education.
 
The share of sons variable is included to reflect the strong degree
 
of son preference. A family with a large percentage of male children may
 
report a relatively high level of desired education for their children.
 
The wage equation
 
The wage equation is viewed as an instrumental variable equation which
 
is estimated with data on women who report wages. 
It is then used to generate
 
a predicted wage for all womeninthe' sample. The wage equation is a standard
 
one which expresses the natural logarithm of wages as a function of a woman's
 
education, labor market experience prior to marriage,13 and her urbanization
 
.l2eTray (1973) argues that urban areas receive more education per
 
-dollar expenditure than do rural areas due to economies of scale in education.
 
Also, the returns to schooling are no doubt easier to realize in more urban
 
areas.
 
13
The work experience during marriage variable is not included in the
 
wage equation as it is an endogenous variable and the wage equation is speci­
fied so as to provide instrumental variable predictions for womnn's wages.
 
Inclusion of a right-hand side endogenous variable is inappropriate in an
 
instrumental variable regression.
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background. The coefficients on all of these variables'are hypothesized to be
 
positive.
 
As discussed in the introduction, estimating a standard wage equation
 
for women who work and using this:estimated relationship to estimate a wage for
 
all women results in sample selectivity bias.14 This can be intuitively explained
 
.nsidering the standard wage equation:
 
(6) in Wi ='Xi + ei i*= 1, .... N 
where ln I is the natural logarithm of the wage rate for the i "woman, is a
 
(lxk) vector of parameters to be estimated, Xi is a (kxl) vector of characteris­
tics (e.g. schooling, experience) of the ith woman, and ei is a random error
 
term. Let N be the number of women in the entire sample and assume that ci is
 
distributed with a mean of zero and a variance of a2. However, the equation
 
can only be estimated for a subset of n,women (where <,N) who report wages.
 
That is,wage data is only available for those women who have chosen to work.
 
If these nI women are not a random sample of the N women, the expected value of
 
the error term ci, given Xi, is no longer equal to zero. In fact, the expected
 
value of the error term depends on the labor force participation decision and
 
therefore,
 
(7) E(ln Wixi, labor force participation decision) 8'X +
 
E ci/labor force participation decision).
 
This violates the assumptions for ordinary least squares estimation. The
 
solution to this problem, as developed by Heckman (1979) and Hay (1980),is
 
14This section is by no means a detailed attempt to explain the correc­
tion for sample selectivity bias. The reader is instead referred to Hay (1980),
 
Heckman (1979, 1980), and Hill (1981).
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to add a variable to the wage equationywhich leads to a zero expectation for
 
the disturbance term In the equation estimated for the r1 women.
 
Since the expected value of the error term "depends on the labor force
 
participation decision'it should be possible to use information on this
 
decision in order to"purge" the error term of its non-zero expectation. 
Following Hay (1980) and Hill (1981), the appropriate regressor to incorporate
 
into the wage equation is defined by:
 
(8) X [piln(Pi) + (l-piln(l-Pi)] 
where P is the probability that the ith woman participates in the labor force. 
This probability can be estimated within the framework of a reduced form logit 
model which expresses labor force participation status as a function of a
 
woman's exogenously determined characteristics. The wage equation corrected
 
for selectivity bias can be written as
 
(9) inWi =I' I + 6%1 + CI i. . . . T1I.
 
The procedure for estimating the wage equation is then to first estimate
 
a reduced form logit model of labor force participation for all women in the
 
sample.15 The dependent variable s a dummy variable which equals one if a woman
 
is participating in the labor forcei zero otherwise. 
This estimated logit
 
model is used to calculate the estimated probability, P1, that each woman will
 
participate in the labor force. 
 This P1 is used to obtain an estimate of 
i
 
15These results are not included in this paper due to space limitations
 
but they are available upon request.
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as defined in equation (8). Then the wage equation given in equation (9)
 
is estimated with data on women who work and report wages., The estimated
 
coefficients from equation (9) are then used to generate estimated market wages
 
for all women.
 
III. The Results
 
The results of estimating equations (1) through (5),are given in Table 2
 
through 7. Each table contains the results ofestimating two versions of each
 
equation: Model 1 corresponds to the definition of work intensity during
 
marriage which includes work in the modern and traditional sector (WKINTAM)
 
while Model 2 corresponds to the definition which includes work in the modern
 
sector only (WKINTAM2). Our preferred model is Model 2 so discussion will
 
focus on that model and interesting contrasts between Model 1 and Model 2
 
will be pointed out.
 
The work intensity during marriage equation
 
The results for this equation are given in Table.2. In general,.the
 
coefficients on CEB are not significantly different from zero and only for
 
women age 35-39 is the coefficient negative. The'coefficients on CEB in
 
Model 1 are consistently larger than the corresponding coefficients in Model
 
2, indicating that there is some slight evidence t%.it children and labor force 
participation are less compatible when labor force 'Darticipation involves 
work in the modern sector. 
As expected, the estimated:coefficients on the wage variables are 
consistently positive and, for Model 2, significantly different from'zero. 
The implied elasticities of labor supply with respect to:thewwoman'swages 
in Model 1 are 0.22, 0.34, and 0.19 for the three 'age groups. In Model 2 
/ V
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these elasticities are 0.66, 1.22, and 0.62 for the three age groups. The
 
elasticity for the middle age group is high but the remaining elasticities
 
from Model 2 appear to be reasonable and within the range reported by Link
 
and Settle (1981), and Schultz (1975) for U.S. women and Hill (1981) for
 
Japanese women participating in the modern labor market.
 
The estimated coefficients on the variable reflecting the presence of
 
non-nuclear family members (DNNFAMM) are positive, indicating that women
 
participate more in the labor market when there are non-nuclear family members
 
living with the household. For the two younger age groups, the influence of
 
non-nuclear family members is stronger for Model 2 which is consistent with
 
the view that modern sector employment and child care activities are not
 
compatible.
 
The remaining variables which strongll influence a woman's labor
 
force participation are EDASPIR (the child quality proxy), OWNLAND (whether
 
the woman's family owns land) and the income variable. Women with desires
 
for high quality children spend significantly less time in the labor market
 
than do women with lower aspirations for child quality. As expected, the
 
estimated coefficients on OWNLAND are positive in Model 1 (a woman is 
more
 
likely to work in agriculture if her family owns land) and negative in Model
 
2 (a woman is less likely to participate in the modern labor market if her
 
family owns land). All of the estimated coefficients on OWNLAND are highly
 
significant. Finally, the coefficient estimates for the LPOINC variable
 
are significant and negative, as hypothesized. A comparison of the magni­
tudes of the coefficients in the two models indicates that the income effect
 
on female labor force participation is greater for employment in the modern
 
'7
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sector than for employment in the agricultural sector. The labor supply
 
elasticities for husband's and non-wage income in Model 1 are -.
'04, -.01,­
and .01 and in Model 2 are -.07, -.08, and -.08 for the three age groups,
 
respectively. The magnitudes of these coefficients seem more consistent
 
with other researchers' estimates of asset income elasticities than with
 
husband's wage elasticities of married women's labor supply.
 
The marital fertility rate equation
 
The results for the ANLBR equation are given in Table 3. As expected,
 
there is a significant nonlinear relationship between children ever born and
 
duration of marriage: increasing the duration of marriage increases children
 
ever born at a decreasing rate. The coefficients on the work intensity var­
iable in Model 2 are negative for two out of three age groups and is significantl
 
negative for the oldest age group. In general, the marital fertility rate
 
and work intensity are positively related in Model 1. These results provide
 
a bit more evidence that the role of mother and worker are lesscompatible
 
for work in the modern sector than for work in the agricultural sector.
 
The negative coefficients on the child quality proxy variable, EDASPIR,
 
indicate a trade-off between quality and quantity of children. However, these
 
estimated coefficients are generally not significantly different!from zero.
 
The estimated coefficients on the wife's and husband's education terms
 
and on the urbanization dummies are generally mixed in sign and not signifi­
cantly different from zero. As expected, the estinated coefficients on the
 
mortality variable, MORTR, are consistently positive and the estimated coef­
ficients on the shure of sons variable are consistently negative., However,
 
care should be taken in interpreting these coefficients as there is-some
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evidence that a spurious correlation problem exists when these variables
 
are included in a children ever bornor a marital fertility rate equation.16
 
For the younger two age groups, the estimated coefficient on MODCONTR
 
(use of modern contraceptive methods) is negative and significantly different
 
from zero. Thus, younger women who use modern methods of birth control have
 
a lower marital fertility rate than do women who do not use modern methods
 
of birth control. However, the coefficient on MODCONTR for women age 35-39
 
1 7 
is positive and significantly different from zero. It may be that older
 
women only began to use modern methods of birth control relatively later in
 
their reproductive years and that older women with more children are more
 
likely to begin using modern birth control methods than are older women with
 
fewer children.
 
The duration of marriage equation
 
The results for the DURPMlR equation are given in Table 4. As expected,:
 
the coefficient on the age dummy variables are positive and of the appropriate
 
relative magnitudes: older women in a given age interval have generally'been
 
married longer than younger women in that age interval. In addition, there is
 
a positive relationship between children ever born and duration of marriage.
 
Husband's and wife's education exert a negative effect on duration of marriage.
 
The partial derivatives of DURMR with respect to wife's and husband's education
 
(evaluated at the mean value of ED and EDH) and their respective t-statistics
 
for Model 2 are:
 
16The reader is referred to Lee and Schultz '(1981) or Lee and.McElwain
 
(1981b) for a detailed discussion of the spurious correlation problemi.
 
17This is also true for the age group 40-44 and 45-49..
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25-29 30-34 35-39 
3DURMR -.1282 -.2088 -.1245 
aED (-3.68) (-5.78) (-3.81) 
BDURMR -.0533 -.0658 -.1191 
-EDH (-1.92) (-2.19) (-4. 23) 
Thus, highly educated men and women significantly delay their age'at marriage.
 
Many studies conclude that highly educated parents have fewer children. These
 
results, in conjunctionwith the results for the education terms in the ANLBR
 
equation, indicate that more educated parents have fewer children because'-they.
 
delay their age at marriage not because they have fewer children, in a marriage 
of a given duration.
 
Other interesting results for this equation are that expectations:of
 
high child mortality rates leads to marriage at an earlier age and'that women
 
who work intensely prior to marriage tend to marry at a later age than women
 
who do not work intensely prior to marriage. The impact of work experience.
 
prior to marriage is greater for employment in the modern sector.
 
mine aspirations ror cnidren's educatlon equation
 
Table 5 presents the results for this equation. The major determinant
 
of aspirations for child quality appears to be the level of education of the
 
18The coefficient on MICR is significant only for age group 30-34. 
In
 
contrast, a similar regression using the 1971 Korean Fertility Survey data (see

Lee and McElwain, 1981) yielded positive and significant coefficients on MICR
 
for five out of six age groups. The poor results for this analysis of the 1974
 
data are probably due to the fact that distinct values for MICR for each indi­
vidual Ward in Seoul and Busan are not available. That is, one value of MICR
 
is assigned to all women in Seoul and another value is assigned to all women
 
In Busan. In the 1971 data, distinct values for MICR were available for all
 
Wards in Seoul and Busan so there was a great deal more variability in the
 
measure of mortality than exists in the 1974 results.
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parents. The derivative of EDASPIR with respect to'ED and EDH (evaluated at 
the means of ED and EDH) and their respective t-statistics are (for Model 2): 
25-29 30-34 35-39 
3EDASPIR 0.1081 .1142 .2043 
BED (1.25) (1.17) (1.74) 
3EDASPIR .0812 .1746 .1130 
BEDH (3.85) (5.43) (4.69) 
The estimated coefficients on CEB again Indicate an insignificant trade­
off between child quality and quantity. Calculated income elasticities of demand
 
for child quality are positive but quite small in magnitude; in Model 2'they
 
are .0022, .0060, and .0067 for the three age groups. A comparison of these
 
elasticities with the income elasticities of demand for child quantity (.0023,
 
.0834, and .0041, respectively) does not provide support for the hypothesis
 
that the income elasticity of demand for child quality ii greater than the
 
income elasticity of demand for child quantity.19 However,. it may be that
 
aspirations for children's education respond less to changes in inco6me.than
 
do aspirations for other dimensions of child quality such as quality of schooling,
 
health, and recreational activities.
 
In general, more urbanized women have higheraspirations for their
 
children's education than do ultra-rural women. Finally, the coefficient on
 
the share of sons variable, SHSN,.is generally positive but not si2nificantlv
 
different from zero.
 
19These results. are similar to'those of Fleisherand Rhoades' (1979)who use the wage of out-of-school youths as a proxy for. child ciuali'tv'. 
g
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The 	wage equatior
 
Tables 6 and 7 contain the results of estimating the wage eqution
 
without a correction for selectivity bias andwith a correction for selectivity
 
bias, respectively. A woman's education level has a positive, significant
 
impact on her wage rate. The coefficients on the urbanization variables are
 
generally positive, indicating that more Urbanized women earn a higher wage
 
than do ultra-rural women. However, the relative magnitudes of the three
 
coefficients do not indicate that ultra-urban receive a higher wage than do 
urban women who in turn receive a higher wage than rural women. 
Inclusion of the correction for*sample selectivity bias, X, has little 
influence on the overall explanatory powerof the equations or on the magnitudes 
of the other estimated coefficients. The one exception to this is that the 
coefficient on the work experience prior:to marriage variable is affected
 
considerably. This may be due to the fact that X may be correlated with work
 
intensity prior to marriage; i.e. a woman's decision to be a currentpartici­
pant in the labor force may be correlated with her work intensity before marriage.
 
IV. 	Conclusions
 
This paper has developed and estimated a simultaneous equation model
 
of intensity of labor force participation during marriage, duration of.marriage,
 
the marital fertility rate, aspirations for children's education, and wages.
 
Some 	of the more interesting results are summarized as follows: 
1. 	Parents' education affects fertility by influencing age at marriage rather
 
than the marital fertility rate. Adult education programs for married
 
adults will thus probably do little to: reduce-fertility.
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2. There is some evidence that a woman who works intensely during her married
 
life will have more children if her Job is compatible with child care.
 
Increasing job opportunities for women may only reduce fertility-if these
 
job opportunities are in the modern sector.
 
3. Labor supply elasticities defined with respect to women's wage rates and
 
those defined with respect to husband's plus non-wage income are greater
 
for employment in the modern sector than they are for employment defined
 
as participation in the modern or agricultural sectors.
 
4. The presence of non-nuclear family members significantly increases the
 
proportion of her married life that a 
woman will work.
 
5. More urbanized women and women who work prior to marriage marry later'than
 
do less urbanized women and women who do not work prior to marriage.
 
Trends in increased urbanization and modernization can be expected to
 
reduce the fertility rate by delaying age at marriage.
 
6. Parents' education levels have a significant positive impact ontheir
 
aspirations for their children's education.
 
7. Younger women who use modern methods of birth control experience a sig-,
 
nificantly lower fertility rate than do young women who do not use modern
 
methods of birth control. Thus, the familyplanning programs which have
 
been sponsored by the Korean government.since 1962 have contributed sig­
nificantly to declining fertility rates among young Korean women.
 
8. Sample selectivity does not seem to introduce a 
major bias in female wage
 
equations estimated with data from a less-developed country. 
 ,
 
A number of refinements and extensions of our model are possible., The
 
results suggest that the structural relationship between labor force partici­
pation and a number of variables such as fertility is differentfor work in,the
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modern sector than it is for work in the informal, agricultural sector. Future
 
work sho ld explore this in more detail. One avenue of investigation might be
 
the incorporation of a multinominal logit equation for labor force participation
 
into the model. Such an equation would allow a more refined analyses of the
 
distinction between working in the modern labor market and working in the
 
informal sector.20
 
A second suggestion for future work involves the relationship between
 
son preference and the trade-off between quality and quantity of children.;:
 
For a country such as Korea, in which parents have strong preferences for male
 
children, it would be interesting to investigate the structural relationship
 
between quality and quantity of male children separately from the relationship
 
for female children.
 
Hill
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Table 1: Definitions of Variables
 
Endogenous Variables 

CEB 

ANLBR 

DURMR 

WKINTAM 

WKINTAM2 

EDASPIR 

LWAGE 

Exogenous Variables
 
DAI, DA2, DA3, DA4 

ED, EDSQ 

EDH, EDHSQ 

MORTR 

SHSN 

LPOINC 

DNNFAMM 

OWNLAND 

WKINTBM 

WKINTBM2 

MICR 

URBAN1 

URBAN2 

URBAN3 

MODCONTR 

Definition
 
Children ever born
 
CEB/DURMR
 
Duration of marriage
 
Work intensity during marriage - modern a,, ­
traditional, agricultural employment,
 
Work intensity during marriage - modern employment
 
Educational aspirations for children (proxy
 
for child quality)
 
Natural logarithm of woman's hourly wage (LWAGE1
 
is calculated on the basis of wage information
 
for women in modern and traditional employment.
 
LWAGE2 is based on information for women on the
 
modern sector only. See Appendix A for details.)
 
Dummy variables with suffixes reflecting deviatior
 
of the woman's age from the youngest age in the
 
five year age interval. For example, DAI has a
 
value of 1 in age group 25-29 if the woman's age
 
is 26. Otherwise DAI is equal to zero.
 
Wife's education and wife's education squared
 
Husband's education and husband's education squared
 
Personal child death rate = number of child
 
deaths divided by CEB
 
Share of surviving sons out of surviving children
 
Natural logarithm of average monthly household
 
income (inWon) not contributed by the wife
 
Dummy variable which equals one if non-nuclear family
 
members are present in household, zero otherwise
 
Dummy variable equal to one if the woman's family
 
owns or rents land, zero otherwise
 
Work intensity before marriage - modern or tra­
ditional, agricultural employment
 
Work intensity before marriage - modern employment
 
Regional child mortality variable
 
Dummy variables reflecting the degree of women's
 
urbanization background. URBANI equals one for
 
the ultra-urbanized woman (one who has spent all
 
of her life in urban areas), zero otherwise. URBAN2
 
is equal to one for the urban woman (one who is cur­
rently living in an urban area and who has spent most
 
but not all of her life in urban areas - she may have
 
been born in a rural area). URBAN3 is equal to one
 
for the rural woman (one who is currently living in
 
a rural area but has not spent her entire life in
 
rural areas - she may have been born in an urban area
 
or spent a portion of her formative years in an urban
 
area). URBAN4 is equal to one for the ultra-rural
 
woman (one who was born ard raised in rural areas and
 
who currently lives in a rural area). URBAN4 is
 
suppressed to present perfect singularity of the
 
design matrix.
 
Use of modern contraceptive methods; equals one if
 
the woman has ever used a modern methods of birth
 
control (e.g. pill, IUD, condom, etc.), zero otherwise.
 
Correction for sample selectivity bias
 
Table 2: Structural Equation Estimates
 
Work Intensity During Marriage Equation (WKINTAM)
 
Independent 
Variables 25-29 t 
Age Group 
30-34 
,,- 35-39 t'4 
Model 1 
Intercept 
CEB 
EDASPIR 
LWAGE1 
DNNFAMH 
OWNLAND 
URBANI 
URBAN2 
URBAN3 
LPOINC 
1.0379 
0.0401 
-0.0657 
0.0668 
0.0184 
0.2943 
-0.1433 
-0.0896 
-0.1500 
-0.0107 
3.38 
1.49 
-2.59 
1.48 
0.74 
7.75 
-3.11 
-1.80 
-4.30 
-2.02 
0.8768 
0.0321 
-0.0864 
0.1350 
0.0027 
0.3270 
-0.0626 
-0.0019 
0.0356 
-0.0039 
3.12 
1.41 
-4.60 
2.92 
0.10 
8.08 
-1.38 
-0.03 
1.06 
-0.75 
1.9144 
0.0017 
-0.1417 
0.965 
0.0620 
0.2834 
-0.0672 
-0.0709 
-0.0716 
0.0045 
6.74 
0.09 
-6.28 
2.36 
2.55 
7.71 
-1.55 
-1.24 
-2.36 
0.89 
R2 0.2572 0.2964 0.4069 
F-statistic 39.06 44.23 66.18 
Model 2 
Intercept 
CEB 
EDASPIR 
LWAGE2 
DNNFAMM 
OWNLAND 
URBAN1 
URBAN2 
URBAN3 
LPOINC 
0.8633 
0.0109 
-0.0675 
0.1028 
0.0364 
-0.1322 
-0.0504 
0.0017 
-0.0599 
-0.0112 
3.17 
0.47 
-2.94 
2.78 
1.68 
-4.21 
-1.31 
0.04 
-1.97 
-2.43 
0.3887 
0.0133 
-0.0634 
0.1838 
0.0415 
-0.1400 
-0.0678 
0.0254 
0.0964 
-0.0130 
1.75 
0.74 
-4.15 
4.78 
1.99 
-4.80 
-1.83 
0.61 
3.46 
-3.26 
1.2945 
-0.0055 
-0.0923 
0.0918 
0.0337 
-0.2313 
-0.0084 
-0.0091 
0.0151 
-0.0116 
5.29 
-0.35 
-4.88 
2.74 
1.61 
-8.15 
-0.23 
-0.18 
.0.58 
-2.80 
R2 0.0411 0.1123 0.1282 
F-statistic 4.83 13.29 14.18 
Notes: 1. The definitions of all variables may be found in Table 1.2. 	 The number of observations are 1025, 955, and 878 for age groups
25-29, 30-34, and 35-39, respectively. 
3. 	Instrumental variable estimates are substituted for the right-hand

side endogenous variables in all structural ;uations.
4. 	Model 1 defines labor force participation to .nclude work in either

the modern or traditional, agricultural sectors of the labor market.
 
Model 2 defines labor force participation to include only partici­
pation in the modern sector.
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Table 3: Structural Equation Estimates
 
Marital Fertility Rate Equation (ANLBR)
 
Independent 

Age Grou
Variables 25-29 
 30-34 
 35-39
 
Model 1 
Intercept 1,3900 1.70 
e ru 
0.1956 
 0.32 0.4584 2.22
DURMR 

-0.1287 

-9.21 
-0.0235 
-6.53 

-0.0124 
-6.93
WKINTAM 

-0.0208 
-0.12 
 0.0220 0.33 
 0.0118 0.31
EDASPIR 

-0.0285 
-0.56 

-0.0067 
-0.32 

-0.0196 
-1.46
MODCONTR 

-0.1047 
-3.22 

-0.0195 
-1.88
ED 0.0207 3.09

-0.0118 
-0.31 
 0.0023 
 0.29 
-0.0029 
-0.74
EDSQ 0.0001 0.09 -0.0011
EDH -1.40 -0.0005 -1.29

-0.0120 

-0.58 0.0003 0.05 

-0.0015 
-0.63
EDHSQ 
 0.0006 
 0.62 
-0.0001 
-0.25 
 0.0001 0.48
MORTR 
 0.2393 1.85 
 0.3006 7.05 
 0.1915 7.52
SHSN 

-0.0210 
-0.49 

-0.0455 

-2.62 
-0.0936
URBAN1 -6.99

-0.0288 
-0.25 

-0.0085 

-0.21 
-0.0298 
-1.80
URBAN2 
 0.0615 
 0.60 
-0.0592 
-1.03 

-0.0546 
-2.33
URBAN3 

-0.0194 

-0.19 0.0244 1.44 

-0.0134 
-0.83
LPOINC 
 0.0063 0.85 
 0.0057 1.95 
 0.0042
LWAGE1 2.38
0.1077 0.57 
 0.1245 1.03 
 0.0789 1.77
 
R2 
 0.1657 
 0.1369 
 0.2468

F-statistic 
 13.36 
 9.93 
 18.83
 
Model 2
Intercept 1.1831 1.58 
 1.4646 3.07 
 0.8519 3.58
DURMR 
-0.1280 
-9.29 

-0.0267 
-6.24
WKINTAM2 
-0.3953 
-1.13 -0.0123 -6.80
0.1732 
 0.93 -0.1125 
-2.48
EDASPIR 

-0.0324 

-0.62 
-0.0290 

-0.98 
-0.0332 
-2.88
MODCONTR 

-0.1029 

-3.16 
-0.0214 
-2.06 
 0.0204 3.03
ED 

-0.0404 
-0.98 
 0.0105 0.99 
 0.0003 0.08
EDSQ 0.0005 0.40 
 0.0003 0.50
EDH -0.0002 -0.45

-0.0112 
-0.54 

EDHSQ 0.0021 0.39 -0.0019 -0.79
0.0006 0.58 
 0.0001 
 0.22 0.0001 0.73
MORTR 
 0.2148 
 1.66 0.3137 
 7.29 0.2129 8.45
SHSN 

-0.0157 

-0.36 
-0.0535 
-2.74 

-0.0788 
-6.08
URBANI 
-0.0661 
-0.77 
 0.0705 1.68 

-0.0156 
-1.06
URBAN2 
 0.0132 0.14 
 0.0178 0.65 

-0.0388 
-1.56
URBAN3 

-0.0708 
-0.81 

-0.0084 
-0.36 
 0.0023
LPOINC 0.17
0.0012 0.14 
 0.0045 
 1.12 0.0012 0.72
LWAGE2 
 0.2483 
 1.27 -0.1363 
-1.51 
 0.0331 0.62
 
R 
 0.1666 
 0.1311 
 0.2417
F-statistic 
 13.45 
 9.45 
 18.32
 
Notes: 1. The definitions of all variables may be found inTable 1.
2. The number of observations are 1025, 955, and 878 for age groups
25-29, 30-34, and 35-39, respectively.
3. Model 1 defines labor force participation to include work in either
the modern or traditional, agricultural sectors of the labor market.
Model 2 defines labor force participation to include only participation
in the modern sector.
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Duration of Marriage Equation (DURMR)
 
Independent

Variables A e Grou25 30-34 35-39 
t t t 
Model 1Intercept 
 2.2162 
 2.82 
 7.7106
DAl 8.59 
 14.5890
0.5147 16.73
2.28 
 0.7099
DA2 2.65 
 0.8196
1.0866 3.26
4.40 
 1.5933 
 5.85
DA3 2.1179
1.4369 8.32
5.25 
 2.7808
DA4 9.51 3.4126
2.1043 12.85
6.19 
 3.7942 
 12.45
CEB 4.3638
1.2729 16.415.09
ED 0.3841 2.08 0.1555

-0.1624 1.15

-2.31 

-0.1593
EDSQ -2.47 
-0.0453
0.0022 -0.74
0.52 

-0.0045
EDH -0.95

-0.0766 -0.0082

-0.97 -1.71

-0.1068
EDHSQ 0.28 -1.37 -0.1343
0.0012 -2.03
0.0020 
 0.45
MICR 0.0009

-0.8666 0.22

-0.23 
 8.9687
URBANI 2.26 2.1140

-0.0334 0.57

-0.15 

-0.3873
URBAN2 -1.41 
-0.9338

-0.7022 -3.06

-2.74 

-0.4553
URBAN3 -1.36 0.1479

-0.0843 0.37

-0.50 

-0.4086
WKINTBM -2.05 
-0.4487

-0.1452 -2.17

-0.61 

-1.0077 

R2 -3.56 -0.8197 -2.540.3855 
 0.4546 
 0.4578
F-statistic 
 45.26 
 55.97 
 52.04
 
Model 2
Intercept 
 2.2267 
 2.86 
 7.7546
DAl 8.70 
 14.7460
0.5115 16.88
2.27 
 0.7419
DA2 2.78 
 0.7746
1.0885 3.09
4.42 
 1.6217
DA3 5.98 
 2.1161
1.4382 8.34
5.28 
 2.7973
DA4 9.62 
 3.4107
2.1076 12.87
6.26 
 3.8677 
 12.74
CEB 4.3695
1.2650 16.48
5.08 
 0.3339
ED 1.81

-0.1611 0.1160

-2.29 0.86

-0.i564 

-2.45
EDSQ 
-0.0496
0.0022 -0.81
0.51 

-0.0041
EDH -0.89 
 -0.0075

-0.0786 -1.56

-0.99 

-0.1141
EDHSQ -1.47 -0.1258
0.0013 -1.91
0.31 
 0.0026
MICR 0.58 
 0.0004

-0.8746 0.10

-0.24 
 8.9801 
 2.28
URBANI 1.5739

-0.0152 0.42

-0.07 

-0.2635
URBAN2 
-0.6838 -0.96 -0.8743 -2.86

-2.66 

-0.3665
URBAN3 -1.10 0.1957

-0.0727 0.49

-0.43 

-0.2874
WKINTBM2 -1.44 -0.3876

-0.1916 -1.88

-0.77 

-1.5023 

-4.61 

-1.2229 

-3.21
 
0.3856 
 0.4595
F-statistic 0.4602
45.28 
 57.08 
 52.54
 
Notes: 
 1. The definitions of all variables may be found in Table 1.
2. The number of observations are 1025, 955, and 878 for age groups
25-29, 30-34, and 35-39, respectively.
3. Model I defines labor force participation to include work in either
the modern or traditional, agricultural sectors of the labor market.
Model 2 defines labor force participation to include only partici­pation in the modern sector.
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Aspirations for Children's Education Equation (EDASPIR)
 
Independent 

Variables 
 A e Grou
25-29 30-34 35-39 
t tt 
Model1Intercept 
CEB T 
WKINTAM 
LWAE1 
ED 
12.3784 
-0.1195 
-0.2212 
-0.13250.3046 
6.99 
-0.98 
-0.40 
-0.212.70 
22.1317 
-0.1711 
0.9102 
-2.58620.3184 
4.39 
-1.37 
1.09 
-1.885 44 
5.1758 
0.1592 
-2.2533 
1.80910 1229 
1.44 
1.12 
-2.70 
1.791.83 
EDSQ -0.0104 -2.88 0.0055 0.57 -0.0189 -2.57 
EDH 
EDHSQ 
0.1604
-0.0041 2.60-1.25 0.07320.0042 1.213 -0.03750 4 -0.69
2.24 
LPOINC 
UR0AN 
URBAN2 
l 
0.00320.6485 
0.8613 
0.131.78 
2.84 
-0.03471.0185 
1.3416 
-0.972 30 
2.09 
0.1011.096  
0.3496 
3.090.27 
0.69 
URBAN3 
SHSN 
R 2 
0.6804 2.110.1292 0.95 
0.2697 
0.3470 1.84
-0.1505 -0 65 
0.2903 
-0.1016 -0.290.8147 . 31 
012376 
F-statstc 31.15 32.11 22.46 
Model 2
 0.26
Intercept 10.7792 6.50 12.1872 3.10 13.61400 0354 3.13

-1 47

-0.1906

-0.87

-0.1021
CEB 

KINTAM2 1.0001 0.92 3.1833 1.64 -0.7475 -0.62

-0 19 1 2 21 1.25
0.29 -0.2229
0.1863
LWAGE2 0.2393 440
0.3277 5.46
0.2874 2.35
ED 
-2.73 -0.0035 -0.33

-3.37 -0.0167

-0.0120
EDSQ 1.37 -0.0281 -0.51
0.0835
0.1551 2.55
EDH 0.0084 2.52

-1.17 0.0049 1.41

-0.0038
EDHSQ 3.04
0.0936
1.17 0.0857 2.31
0.0326
LPOINC 2.50
0.7191
0.67
0.3385
0.6015
URBAN1 2.33 
-0.32 1.3834 2.85

-0.1124
0.8045 2.94
URBAN2 2.66
0.7052
0.93
0.2572
0.6794 2.69
URBAN3 1.24
0.4263
0.86 -0.3040 -1.21
0.1161
SHSN 

R2 0.2955 
0.23170.2718 

21.74
32.93
31.48
F-statistic 

a at i.ti
Notes: . The definitions of all variables may be found in Table 1.
 2. The number of observations are 1025, 955, and 878 for age groups
 
25-29, 30-34, and 35-39, respectvely.

3. Model 1 defines labor force participation to include workn ether
 
the modern or traditional, agricultural sectors of the abor market. 
Model 2 defines labor force participation to include only partcpaton 
in the modern sector.
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Table 6: Standard Wage Equation
 
Independent ge Groun
 
Variables 2-29 30-34
 
: 35-39 
Model 1
Intercept 2.8963 
 13.80 3.8083 17.37 3.7037:":28.75
ED 
 0.1240 2.68 
 0.0024 0.05
EDSQ 0.0064 'L..0.17
0.0001 0.03 
 0.0072 2.39 
 0.0080'
URBAN1 2.66
0.2791 1.60 
 0.2021 1.00 
 0.0972
URBAN2 0.50
0.1261 0.70 
 0.3881 1.65
URBAN3 0.2404 0.84
0.2634 1.82 

-0.1667 
-1.00 
 0.1519
WKINTBM 1.21
0.4048 2.05 
 0.0741 0.34 
 0.2829 1.35
 
R2 
 0.3465 
 0.3040' 
 0.2478'
F-statistic 
 16.61 
 12.23r 
 10.82
 
# of
 
observations 
 195 
 175 
.. 204 
Model 2Tnt rceptp 
ED 
EDSQ 
URBANI 
URBAN2 
URBAN3 
WKINTBM2 
2.78752.7875 
0.1516 
-0.0006 
0.2870 
0.2766 
0.2768 
0.3630 
13.1913.19 
3.23 
-0.21 
1.61 
1.45 
1.81 
1.73 
3.01:3.7031 
0.0082 
0.0069 
0.3954 
0.2986 
-0.1414 
0.2238 
16.33 
0.17 
2.30 
1.80 
1.20 
-0.76 
1.02 
3.6385 
0.0124 
0.0080 
0.1033 
0.2988 
0.1700 
0.3324 
24.95 
0.30 
2.53 
0.50 
0.99 
1.23 
1.51 
R2 
F-statistic 
0.4439 
18.49 
0.3796 
14.07 
0.2831 
10.86 
of 
observations 146 145 172 
Notes: 
 1. The definitions of all variables may be found in Table 1.
2. Model 1 defines labor force participation to include work in either
the modern or traditional, agricultural sectors of the labor market.
Model 2 defines labor force participation to include only partici­pation in the modern sector.
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Table 7: 
 Wage Equation Corrected for Selectivity Bias
 
Independent
 25-

Variables 

Model 1 
Intercept 
ED 
URB'AN 
URBAN2 
URBAN3 
WKINTBM 
p 
3.0280 
0.13880.0001 
0.3751 
0.2050 
0.3589 
0.2290 
0.1550 
t 
t 
12.34 
2.87 0.02 
1.90 
1.04 
2.10 
0.88 
1.04 
4.0655 
0.0107 
0.0082 
0.3147 
0.4681 
-0.0483 
-0.1026 
0.2842 
t 
15.73 
0.22 
2.69 
1.50 
1.97 
-0.27 
-0.43 
1.85 
, 
3.9083 
0.0424 
0.0080 
0.3473 
0.4495 
0.3591 
-0.0632 
0.4035 
25.56 
1.04 
2.68 
1.58 
1.52 
2.37 
-0.25 
2.41 
R0.3502 
F-statistic 0.3179 0.269514.40 
 11.12 
 10.33
 iof
 
observations 
 195 
 175 
 204
 
Model 2
Intercept 
 3.2344 
 8.23 
 4.0148 
 12.18
ED 3.701 17.08
0.1700 
 3.50 
 0.0150
EDSQ 
-0.0006 0.30 0.0120 0.29

-0.21 
 0.0067 
 2.24
URBAN1 0.0081
0.2373 2.55
1.31 0.3469
URBAN2 1.56 0.1051 0.51
0.2337 
 1.21 
 0.2484 
 0.99
URBAN3 0.3051
0.2908 1.90 1.00

-0.1794
WKINTBM2 -0.96 0.1732
0.0362 1.25
0.11 
 0.0965 
 0.40 
 0.2844 
 1.13
0.2021 
 1.35 
 0.1433 
 1.30 
 0.35 
 0.39
 
0.4511 
 0.3871 
 0.2837
F-statistic 
 16.20 
 12.36 
 9.28
 
4/of
 
observations 
 146 
 145 
 172
 
Notes: 
1. The definitions of all variables may be found in Table 1.
2. Model 1 defines labor force participation to include work in either
the modern or traditional, agricultural sectors of the labor market.
Model 2 defines labor force participation to.include only nrti4nni,,
in the modern sector.
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